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GOD, FREEDOM, AND GRACE 
Reflections on the Essentiality of Atheism for Marx and Marxism1 
by Miroslav Volf 
Dr. Miroslav Volf (Pentecostal Evangelical Church) is a professor of systematic 
theology at the Evangelical Theological School in Osijek, Yugoslavia. He is a 
graduate of that school and received his Ph.D. degree at the Evangelisch Theologische 
Fakultat in Tiibingen, West Germany. He was a lecturer at the Fuller Theological 
Seminary in California and has lectured widely throughout the world. This article 
was first published in the Neue Zeitschrift fiir Systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie ed. by Oswald Bayer, Verlag de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 
Vol. 3 1  ( 1989). pp. 2 13-229. Used by permission of the author and publisher. 
Whether atheism is essential for Marxism is one of the key questions in the Marxist­
Christian dialogue. Both Christian theologians and Marxist philosophers have written 
extensively about this problem. Unless they belong to the dogmatically-minded segment of 
either group, they tend to deny the essentiality of atheism for Marxism. After long years of 
mutual denunciation, a growing consensus of open-minded Christians and Marxists on such 
a significant question is a hopeful sign. But if the unanimity is not to be short-lived, it is 
necessary to investigate carefully to what extent Marxists (or Christians) are true to Marx 
when they maintain that atheism is not essential to Marxism. 
By raising this question I do not intend to suggest that Marxists should feel bound to the 
letter of Marx' texts. But neither should one assume that Marxism can disregard the thought 
of its founder without losing its own identity. For this reason I believe that the success of 
the Marxist-Christian dialogue depends partly on the ability of both parties to differentiate 
consciously and carefully between what Marx actually said and what marxists are ready or 
not ready to accept. Without such differentiation the tendency is to sweep Marx' 
unacceptable theses conveniently under the carpet. The foolishness of such a procedure 
becomes obvious, of course, at the first spring cleaning. It is necessary to deal first with the 
problem of the essentiality of atheism in Marx' thought and then to state clearly to what 
extent an for what reasons one should or should not follow Marx. 
1I want to thank my colleague, Dr. Gerald Shenk, at the Biblical-Theological Institute, 
Zagreb/Osijek (Yugoslavia) for his valuable comments on some previous versions of this study. 
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Marxists must define how they identify with or differ from Marx. As a theologian I 
want to contribute to this process of self -definition by critically examining the place of 
atheism in the thought of Marx himself. My purpose is not to give a comprehensive analysis 
of Marx' views on atheism and Christianity, but to deal mainly with those aspects of his 
critique of religion that are essentially linked to his theory of alienation and emancipation. 
Against the thesis that Marx' atheism can best be explained by the negative social influence 
of Christianity, I will argue first directly and then indirectly that the foundation of Marx' 
atheism lies in his anthropology (II and V) and answer two of the most common objections 
to such view (III and IV). In the last part I will draw some conclusions about when it is 
acceptable from a Christian perspective to talk about Christians that are Marxists or Marxists 
that are Christians (VI). But before embarking on an analysis of Marx' thought it is 
necessary to define the main terms discussed and note the reasons for a new investigation of 
the topic(!). 
I 
( I )  It is impossible to give a meaningful answer to the question whether atheism is 
essential to Marxism without defining the central terms of the question. They are equivocal 
both in what they connote and what they denote. As for connotations, the terms "atheism" 
and "Marxism" are in some circles potent pseudo-religious symbols. Their emotional charge 
makes the investigation of Marxist atheism a risky endeavor. Since the risk can be avoided 
only by remaining silent, however, I ask the reader to distinguish carefully between the 
subjective connotations the terms may have for the reader and what they denote objectively 
for this author. 
The term Marxism does not stand here for dialectical materialism as a closed materialistic 
world-view of either Engels', Lenin's or Stalin's type, but for a humanistically oriented 
analysis and theory of society. This I also take to be the main thrust of Marx' thought. 
A theism in this study signifies a view that is incompatible with the conscious affirmation that 
a personal God, Creator and Redeemer of the world, exists. It includes active anti-theism, 
indifferent theoretical atheism, and a-theism as the absence of God-consciousness. When it 
is necessary to differentiate between mere methodological atheism and atheism that is 
incompatible with the objective existence of God, I use instead of "atheism" the term 
metaphysical atheism. Finally, I call those characteristics essential without a phenomenon 
cannot exist without losing its identity. 
(2) The fundamental importance of Marx' and Marxist atheism for the Marxist-Christian 
dialogue stems from the fact that the question whether atheism is essential for Marx and 
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Marxism is the flip side of the question whether the Christian faith is essentially alienating. 2 
Marx' atheism is a challenge not only to the intellectual· but also the moral integrity of 
Christians. It is thus imperative to investigate whether Marx' critique of religion is directed 
against every form of Christianity which does not want to deny its own identity and to what 
extent Marx' critique of religion is justified (whether it is pertinent only to some historical 
forms of Christianity or to the essence of Christianity). But the question of Marx' atheism 
is important also for Marxists for similar reasons. To the extent that Marx' critique of 
Christianity is mistaken (or at least is not justified for every form of Christianity), the 
question whether atheism is essential for Marx is at the same time a question whether Marx' 
thought is essentially alienating. For if Marx' (unjustified) atheism is an integral aspect of 
his humanism, then Marx' thought essentially contributes to human alienation. 
Much, however, has already been written about the important topic of Marx' atheism. 
Why another study? First, there are reasons of a purely scholarly nature for a reexamination 
of Marx' atheism. The thesis that I will defend is not new, but it is unpopular among both 
open-minded Christians and Marxists. Of more than twenty representative authors who 
wrote about Marx' atheism in a recent and laudable edition of the Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies, 3 only a small minority agrees with my position. Hence the need to respond to 
objections raised against the thesis and to reinforce it with additional arguments. 
A second reason for a reexamination of Marx' atheism is found in the recent religious 
and political developments in countries where the Communist Party is at the helm. 
Beginning with the People's Republic of China in the mid-seventies, 4 almost all socialist 
societies (some more and some less cautiously) have started implementing the policy of open 
hand toward religion, which is an integral part of a general economic, political and cultural 
opening of these societies. At the same time it is becoming apparent that secularization in 
socialist societies is not advancing as fast as Communists had hoped and Christians feared. 
As sociological investigations show, it slowed down, possibly even halted, giving way to the 
process of the revitalization of religion. 5 These political and religious developments might 
be trends of a short or long duration, but in any case they demand that the dialogue between 
2Cf. Arthur F. McGovern, "Atheism :Is It EssentialTo Marxism?" JES, 22 ( 1985), 499. 
3 JES, 22 ( I  985), no.3 ,  ed. Paul Mojzes. 
4Cf. Orlando E. Costas, "The Experience of God in the New China", The Judson Bulletin 6 
( 1987), 4 l ff. 
5Cf. Srdjan Vrcan, Od krize religi je k religi ji krize. Prilog raspravi o religi ji u uvjetima 
suvremene krize [From Crisis of Religion to Religion of Crisis. A Contribution to the Discussion 
on Religion in the Conditions of the Contemporary Crisis], Zagreb, 1 986, 1 56 .  
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Christians and Marxists which was carried on in the late fifties and sixties be revived. In this 
dialogue the question of atheism will be central and Marx' views on it pivotal. 
It could be objected that the investigation of atheism in Marx' and Marxist thought is 
more or less irrelevant to the problems of the social co-existence of Christians and Marxists. 
The key question, one can argue, is not whether (or to what extent) atheism is a logically 
necessary component of Marx' and Marxist thought, but whether Marxists will continue to 
insist on atheism in the foreseeable future. 6 This indeed is the key question but not the only 
important one. Having learned something from Marx about the influence of social reality 
on thought, I believe that in most cases political reasons contribute decisively both to the 
insistence that atheism is essential to Marxism (by most Communist Parties in power) and to 
the concession that it is accidental to Marxism (by most Communist Parties which are 
fighting for power). Hence it is necessary to analyze the practical reasons for clinging to 
essentiality or for advocating accidentality of atheism for Marxism. But such a task does not 
make the present investigation of the place of atheism in Marx' and Marxist thought 
superfluous. Unlike dogmatically minded Marxists I believe that the relation between social 
reality and thought cannot adequately be described as the (ultimately) unilateral 
determination of thought by social reality. It is to be expected that the quality of Christians' 
and Marxists' co-existence will be influenced significantly by their attitudes about the place 
of atheism in Marx' and Marxist thought. 
II 
Many open-minded Marxist philosophers and Christian theologians advocate the view 
that Marx' critique of religion "pertains exclusively to its social function." 7 For Marx religion 
is problematic only insofar as it prevents integral human liberation. Correspondingly, it is 
believed that Marx' atheism does not deny every god (especially not the one true God), but 
only the god of the dominant historical forms of Christianity with which Marx was familiar 
in the nineteenth century. Marx' universal atheistic declarations, it is claimed, rest on an 
illicit generalization about every god on the basis of ideas of god that were familiar to him. 
If this generalization is the main source of Marx' atheism, then the god Marx denies and the 
6Cf. Quentin Lauer, "Response Occasioned by McGovern's Atheism: Is it Essential to Marxism?," 
JES, 22 ( 1 985) ,  524. 
7Nikola Skledar and Mislav Kukoc, "Toward a Critique of the Marxian Criticism of Religion," 
in The Conrad Grebel Review 3(1 985), 9 1 ;  differently Nikola Skledar, Urn i religija: Uvod u teorije 
religije [Mind and Religion. An Introduction into Theories of Religion], Sarajevo/Zadar, 1 986,32. 
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God Christians affirm are different gods;8 then also the expectation is justified that marxists 
will revise their critique of religion if it is shown that the notion of god that Marx criticizes 
does not correspond to the reality of the Christian God. 
The way in which the young Marx embraced atheism, however, suggests that such an 
interpretation of his atheism is incorrect. The correspondence of Marx at seventeen with his 
father shows that "the reasons for Marx' change to atheism were not of a moral nature, which 
is frequently the case with young people, nor was it caused by a sociopolitical rebellion 
against reactionary Christianity of that time, but it was due to serious personal reasons of an 
intellectual and emotional nature."9 But Marx need not have remained an atheist for the 
same reasons he became one. The decisive argument against the claim that Marx' atheism 
denies only the god of reactionary forms of Christianity is to be sought elsewhere. I suggest 
that the conflict between Marx and the Christian faith stems primarily from the fact that 
they operate with a different understanding of the agent of human liberation. Marx raises 
the objection not only that in the Christian faith God (allegedly) hinders human liberation 
and the realization of human potentialities. Even if Marx were faced with indubitable proofs 
that belief in God functioned as a stimulus to human liberation, this would not be a 
sufficient reason for Marx to abandon atheism. For every liberation action of God implies 
an experience of God's grace. This is unacceptable to Marx because he maintained that a 
person who lives through the grace of another is a dependent, and thus an unfree, being.10 
Christian faith is thus problematic for Marx not only because it impedes needed social 
changes, but also because it does not insist on human being s as the exclusive agents of their 
own emancipation. 
Marx' polemic against God's grace, which is the cornerstone of the Christian faith, 
clearly shows that atheism is essential to Marx' humanism and consequently to his theory of 
emancipation. Marx defines emancipation from the outset as liberation from God, whether 
or not God functions as a cunningly disguised enemy or a manifest friend of human beings. 
To think that Marx' critique of religion ends with the "categorical imperative to overthrow 
all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken despicable being"11 is to misread 
8Cf. Torno Veres, Filozofsko-teoloski di jalog s Marxom: Misao i praksa u d jelu Karla Marxa 
[The Philosophical-Theological Dialogue with Marx: Thought and Practice in the Work of Karl 
Marx], Zagreb, 1 98 1 ,  269. 
9Tomo Veres, "The Ambivalence of Marx' Atheism," JES, 22 ( 1 985),  552-553. 
1°Karl Marx, "Oekonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, 
Berlin, 1 977, Erganzungsband I, 544. 
11Karl Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, 
Werke, Berlin, 1 977,  I, 385 .  
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Marx. He explicitly states that it ends with "the teaching that man is the highest being for 
man", or, differently stated, that "the root of man is man himself."12 Marx' categorical 
imperative follows ("hence"!13) from this radically atheistic thesis. 
There is one important anthropological notion of Marx which seems to deaden the 
sharpness of his polemic against God's grace. If developed by Marxists, it could prove 
valuable in the Christian-Marxist dialogue. It is his belief that human existence is always 
partly a result of grace.14 At first glance it might seem that the text in Economic­
Philosophical Manuscripts in which Marx polemicizes against God's grace refers to the 
individual and his self-constitution ("A being is independent. . .A man who lives by the grace 
of another . . .  and I live completely . . .  "15) .  In that case all human dependence would be 
anthropologically unacceptable. But the context makes it clear the Marx does not think of 
the individual, but of "man" in the generic sense. An individual human being does not "owe" 
his existence to himself, but to "man."16 To owe one's existence (first to one's parents and 
then to the whole human race) is to have it through graceP Given this acceptance of grace 
by Marx, it would seem that a Marxist anthropology that does not want to stray away form 
Marx' path but dares to modify some aspects of his thought could accept the thesis that 
human beings can live as free and unalienated beings in relation to a loving God who created 
them. 
III 
Two basic objections can be raised against the argument that atheism is essential in Marx' 
thought, given his polemic against God's grace. One can object ( 1  )that it disregards the fact 
that Marx' humanism presupposes the erroneous competitive understanding of the relation 
between God and human beings, and (2)that Marx' polemic should not be understood as an 
expression of metaphysical but only methodological atheism. I will examine these two 
objects in the present and the following section. 
12Ibid. [Italics mine.] 
13Ibid. 
14Cf. on that problem Miroslav Volf, "Zukunft der Arbeit-Arbeit der Zukunft. Das 
Arbeitsverstandnis bei Karl Marx und seine theologische Wertung," Miinchen/Mainz, 1 988,  [ ?]. 
15Karl Marx, "Oekonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte," in op.cit., 544. 
16Ibid. ,  545. 
17 A similar idea is expressed more concretely in German Ideology (cf. Karl Marx/Friedrich 
Engels, "Die deutsche Ideologie," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin, 1 977, III, 25). 
20 
( 
Like the young Engels, 18 Marx combines his fundamentally atheistic anthropological 
thesis that human beings are the highest beings for themselves with Feuerbach's 
understanding of the relationship between God and human beings.19 According to 
Feuerbach, God and human beings stand in a relation of inverted proportion: the more 
qualities human beings invest through faith in God, the fewer qualities remain for 
themselves. It follows that human beings develop integrally only if God does not exist. 20 
Since Marx adopted the Feuerbachian dichotomy between God and human beings, if he 
decided in favor of human liberation 'he had to decide against God. Thus, some philosophers 
and theologians have concluded, the Feuerbachian dichotomy "is the ultimate foundation of 
Marx' atheism." 21 
If this interpretation of Marx' atheism is correct, then his atheism rests again on an 
erroneous generalization. Only now this generalization is not based on a particular historical . 
form of Christianity but on a particular philosophical understanding of the genesis of 
religious ideas in the human mind. Since in the biblical revelation God and human beings 
are partners and not competitors over a set amount of desirable attributes, 2 2  Feuerbach's view 
of the creation of religious ideas is not applicable in this case. But even without Feuerbach's 
theory of projection Marx' polemic against God's grace remains. This polemic is not 
logically dependent on the theory of projection (although it is necessary to the theory of 
projection), and is based on an aspect of Marx' anthropology that he developed under the 
influence of Fichte. 
In accordance with his understanding of the absolute I, Fichte maintained that for the 
individual human I is nothing more "unbearable then only to exist . . .  for someone and 
through someone else." 23 A human being can be free only if he is "his own creation," if he 
18 Cf. Friedrich Engels, "Die Lage Englands," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin, 
1 977, I, 543. 
19Cf. Karl Marx, "Okonomische-philosophische Manuskripte, in op.cit . ,  520; Karl Marx, 
"Ausziige aus James Mills Buch 'Elemens d'economie politique'," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, 
Werke, Berlin, 1 977,  Erganzungsband I, 466. 
2°Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, Samtliche Werke, ed. by Wilhelm Bolin, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1 96 1 ,  
VI, I ff. 
21 Arthur F. McGovern, op.cit., 534; cf. Jose Miguez Bonino, "Atheism: Is it Essential to 
Marxism?" JES, 22 ( 1 985), 537.  
2 2Cf. ,for instance, the biblical understanding of work as co-operation with God (Miroslav Volf, 
op.cit.). 
23Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Samtliche Werke, ed. by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin, 1 845/46, 
II, 249. 
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is "absolutely independent, and through himself perfect and complete." 2 4  There is an 
important difference between Fichte's and Marx' understanding of freedom and 
independence. Marx is not pleading for a complete independence of human beings from 
their human and non-human environment. Such an independence would contradict his 
materialistic understanding of human beings as natural beings. Differing from Fichte, he 
does not plead for "absolute independent self -activity." 2 5 But, apart from a certain form of 
dependence between human beings and dependence of human beings on nature, for Marx 
nothing is more unbearable than to exist through someone else and for somebody else. He 
insists that human beings can be independent and free if they owe their existence exclusively 
to themselves. 2 6 For this reason the creative and redemptive work of God stand in an 
irreconcilable contradiction to the creative work of human beings. The contradiction is not 
Feuerbachian: the more one ascribes to God, the less remains for human beings. The 
contradiction is Fichteo-Marxian: the more one depends on God, the less one is free. 
Formulated differently: as long as one is in the least way dependent on God, one is not 
completely free. The independence of human beings as the only authentic form of their 
existence demands that "there be no other [God]" besides them. 2 7  
Marx' polemic against God's grace, which rests on  his understanding of  human beings 
and their freedom, indicates clearly that his critique of religion is not directed only against 
an erroneous concept of God as human beings' parasitic competitor, but against every belief 
in God who graciously acts in their favor. In spite of some important disparities between 
the God that Marx denies and the God which biblical and authentic Christian traditions 
affirm, the object of reflection is in part the same God. Moreover, the common feature in 
Marx' and Christians' concept of God (God's grace) is one of the most fundamental 
characteristics of the authentic Christian understanding of God. 
IV 
It is sometimes asserted that Marx' polemic against God's grace does not demand 
metaphysical but merely methodological atheism. Marx' atheism would differ from atheism 
inherent in the modern sciences in that it dispenses with the "hypothesis God" not only in the 
2 4 Ibid., 256. 
2 5Ibid., 249. 
2 6Karl Marx, "Okonomische-philosophische Manuskripte," in op.cit., 544. 
2 7  Karl Marx, "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," in Karl 
Marx/Freidrich Engels, Werke, Berlin, 1 977, Erganzungs band I, 262. 
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process of the theoretical explanation of the world but also in the process of its practical 
change. If one understands Marx' atheism in this fashion, then the purpose of his polemic 
against faith in God would be to direct people "so that in their activity, especially in their 
sociopolitical activity, they rely on themselves, on their knowledge, on their mutual help and 
solidarity." 28 Such atheism could be called a "postulate of a practical reason" 29 because its 
sole justification is its function of making people depend completely on their own powers. 
Belief in God would be unacceptable only insofar as it prevents such self -reliance. But as 
long as human beings act as if there were no God, they are free to interpret religiously their 
deeds as if they were the result of God's grace: 
Such methodological atheism is incompatible with the Christian understanding of 
salvation by grace. Salvation takes place "without [human] works," excl�sively "by faith" in 
God's work for human beings.30 Salvation is accomplished by God for human beings 
(however, not apart from their subjectivity as those who believe and live in accordance with 
their belief) and thus it is and must remain a result of God's grace. Because it is not possible 
for salvation to take place as if there were no God, it is not possible for salvation to take 
place as if there were no God, it is also impossible merely to interpret it as a result of God's 
grace. In relation to the very core of Christian understanding of salvation, i.e. in relation to 
Christians becoming and remaining Christian, methodological theism is not the only theology 
desirable but indispensable. Methodological atheism, however, has an important place in 
relation to Christian living in the world. As Luther pointed out in his interpretation of Psalm 
1 27, God's help and provision does not relieve the people of their own planning and working. 
On the contrary, God's provision takes place in that human beings "behave as if there were 
no God and as if they had to save themselves and rule by themselves."31 
But the question is not only to what extent methodological atheism ( if we assume 
metaphysical theism) is compatible with Christian faith, but to what extent methodological 
atheism(again if we assume metaphysical theism) is compatible with Marx' humanism? The 
second question must be answered in the negative. Marx questions not only God's grace 
which helps human beings in their sociopolitical activity, but also the grace of God which 
is expressed in the very relation of God as Creator to human beings. The belief in God's 
creation is in Marx' view the most radical expression of human dependence on God. In one 
28Marko Kersevan, "Atheism: Is it Essential to Marxism?" JES,22( 1 985), 504; cf. Helmut 
Gollwitzer, Die marxistische Religionskritik und der christliche Glaube, Gi.itersloh, 1 977, 83 .  
29Kersevan, op.cit., 505. 
30Romans 3:28 
31Martin Luther, D. Martin Luther's Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Weimar, 1 883ff. XV, 373, 
3; cf. Oswald Bayer, Aus Glauben Ieben: Uber Rechtfertigung und Heiligung, Stuttgart, 1 984, 36ff. 
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of the most fundamental texts of his whole critique of religion Marx says: "A being does not 
regard himself as independent unless he is his own master, and he is only his master when 
he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another considers himself 
as a dependent being. But I live completely by another person's grace when I owe to him not 
only the continuance of my life but also its creation; when he is its source. My life has 
necessarily such a cause outside itself if it is not my own creation."3 2 No matter how strongly 
we stress it is desirable that human beings live for themselves (which, except in relation to 
salvation, is in a certain sense imperative in Christian theology). The reason is simple, even 
what a human being is "through himself he is through God who created him to be such."33 
Marx rightly maintains that a being which owes its existence to God "lives completely by 
another person's grace."34 A person who lives by the grace of another being "does not stand 
on his own feet"3 5  but has a "foreign foundation", which can only mean that in and of itself 
it "has no foundation."3 6  As creatures human beings necessarily praise their creator through 
every one of their achievements. As Marx says in "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts", 
instead of confirming (bestatigen) themselves in their action, created human beings are, as 
everything "established," "only confirmation of the act of establishing."37 
Since human dependence on God necessarily follows from the acceptance of God as 
creator of human beings, Marx' atheism cannot be considered a mere postulate of the 
practical mind. Metaphysical atheism as the denial of the objective existence of God the 
Creator is the necessary implication of consistent methodological atheism. Marx' humanism 
is thus not only a-theistic in the sense that God is simply absent from it, but in the sense that 
it is incompatible with the objective existence of God the Creator. 
It seems that there are only two ways of conceiving God that could escape Marx' critique 
of human dependence on God. Both would amount to a radical reinterpretation of the 
Christian notion of God. Moreover, the first is inadequate from the perspective of any 
religion. Those who declare that atheism is not essential for Marx and Marxism, in that they 
suggest precisely these two concepts of God, indirectly confirm the thesis that the denial of 
a personal God, Creator and Redeemer, is an essential aspect of Marx' humanism. 
3 2Karl Marx, "Okonomische-philosophische Manuskripte,"in og.cit., 544. 
33Michael Landman, Fundamental-Anthropologie, Bonn, 1 979, 224. 
34Karl Marx, op.cit., 544. 
3 5Ibid. 
3 6Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, ed by Eva ¥oldauer/Karl Markus Michel, 
Frankfurt a M., 1 97 1 ,  XII, 372f. 
37Marx, op.cit., 577. 
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It is possible to understand religious consciousness as one of the many forms of human 
production, say as a "poetic metaphor."38 In order to come to an understanding of religion 
which would be compatible with Marx' humanism, it would in addition be necessary to 
differentiate between alienated forms of religious production and those that are "alienated, 
creative, human."39 The latter would be an acceptable form of human religious production, 
the former not. The distinction between alienating and human forms of religion is 
indispensable for Christian theology; however it  is impossible in the context of Marx' 
understanding of religion as a human product and his theory of alienation. Human forms 
of religious production would be only those that are immune to his critique of alienation. 
The distinction would only be possible within the framework of Marx' thought provided that 
. 
human beings were aware that the "God" in whom they believe is ( I )their own product (2)to 
whom they are not subject but over whom they rule. A " humane God" would thus be a god 
without transcendence and without holiness. As the phenomenon of secular religion 
illustrates, religious consciousness is possible without transcendence. The presence of the 
holy is, however, constitutive for it. 4° For religious consciousness as religious consciousness 
it is essential not to include the awareness of ruling the object of religious worship: it is 
impossible religiously to relate to a "god" over whom one has power. Moreover, in the 
context of monotheistic religion the very notion of such a "god" is contradictory: a god who 
is not the Lord of Lords is not God (irrespective of, for instance, God's lordship being 
expressed paradoxically in the form of God's service to and suffering for human beings, as 
in Christianity). It seems reasonable to me that Marx did not envisage the possibility of 
unalienated forms of religion in an unalienated society, as he did unalienated forms of art. 41 
If we do not want to deprive religion of what constitutes it as religion, then, given Marx' 
basic paradigm of alienation and emancipation, religion necessarily represents a form of 
alienation. 4 2  
38Kersevan, op.cit. , 504; Esad Cimic, "Marx's Critique of Religion and/or Atheism," JES, 22 
( 1 985), 524. 
39Skledar and Kukoc, op.cit., 92. 
4°Cf. Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the non Rational factor in the Idea 
of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, London/Oxford/New York , l 950; Mircea Eliade, 
Geschichte der religiosen Ideen, Freiburg/Basel Wien, 1 978.  
41Contra Esad Cimic, "Mogucnosti marksistickog pristupa fenomenu religije" [The Possibility of 
a Marxist Approach to the Phenomenon of Religion], in Religija i drustvo [Religion and Society], 
Zagreb, 1 987,  32.  
4 2  A compromise could be attempted: one could deprive religion of the dimension of 
transcendence by understanding it as a form of human production, but could respect the dimension 
of holiness in religion by allowing it to "claim" human beings as persons (cf. Kersevan, "Mogucnost 
religije u Marxovoj misli i suvremenoj marksistickoj praksi" [The Possibility of Religion in Marx' 
25 
Marx' critique of human dependence on God could be averted by understanding God in 
an impersonal way, say as "an infinite open room that challenges and invites, an ever 
expanding possibility of newness and future." 43 Such a description of God is compatible with 
the attribution of personality to God, but is relevant to the question of the essentiality of 
atheism for Marx only if it is taken to imply that God is impersonal. Given an impersonal 
God, human dependence on God would be analogous to dependence on nature, which in 
Marx view did not call into question the humanness of human beings. Belief in an 
impersonal God could be compatible with Marx' denial of human dependence on God. The 
difficulties with the notion of personality when applied to God not withstanding, in Christian 
theology personality is an inalienable attribute of God 4 4  because to address God as "Thou" 
is constitutive of the Judeo-Christian experience. 
v 
That the polemic against human dependence on God the Creator and Redeemer-- a  
polemic that follows from Marx' thesis that human beings are the highest beings for 
themselves--is the cornerstone of Marx' atheism can be demonstrated indirectly by showing 
how all the different aspects of Marx' critique of religion can be seen as selections of a 
building erected on this cornerstone. A sketch of this demonstration follows. 
By arguing that the polemic against God's grace is the unifying center of Marx' thinking 
about religion, I am not suggesting that his thinking did not develop during the course of his 
life. My contention is that this development does not contain contradictions and ruptures, 
which must be ascribed to Marx if one understands the cornerstone of his atheism differently 
(except in the case of taking the Feuerbachian dichotomy between God and human beings, 
for which the polemic against human dependence on God in integral, to be the foundation 
of Marx' atheism). If, for instance, one maintains that Marx' atheism is merely 
methodological, then the reason for his uncompromising polemic against God's grace 
expressed in the doctrine of creation is unclear. Or if one maintains that Marx' critique of 
Thought and in Contemporary Marxist Practice], Kulturni radnik, 1 5  [ 1 987] 1 37). But since there 
can be no holy object over which one can dispose, and since there can be no emancipation in a 
Marxian sense without disposing over one's own products (whether material or spiritual), this solution 
seems unfortunate both from a theological and from a Marxist standpoint. 
43Jose Miguez Bonino, op.cit., 539. 
4 4Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, New York, 1 984, 1 52ff. 
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religion relates only to the social function of religion, then orre must assume a rupture in the 
development of Marx' critique of religion after his dissertation. 4 5 
(l)The fundamentally atheistic thesis that human beings are the highest beings for 
themselves is compatible with Marx' understanding of the mechanism of the creation of 
religion, according to which religious concepts are a reflection of the alienated reality in 
which human beings live. Since human beings are not actually the highest beings, they need 
the "fantastic realization of [their] being" in religion as a "festive supplement" for what is 
lacking in their everyday lives. 4 6 
Moreover, the theory of the social "production" of religion contains a denial of the 
existence of the Christian God. True, since the theory does not implX anything about the 
objective existence of God, but only explains the genesis of what is predicated about God 
and denies that what is predicated has an objectively existing object of reference, it is not 
strictly atheistic but agnostic. But it is atheistic in relation to the Christian God in that it 
• 
implies that everything Christians ascribe to God and ever could ascribe to him cannot be 
taken as attributes of an actually existing being. 
(2)The polemic against dependence on God can explain well the importance Marx 
ascribes to critique of religion. This polemic is an important presupposition of every other 
type of critique for it represents the paradigm for the critique of all other forms of 
alienation, especially economic alienation. 47 Like religious alienation, these other forms of 
alienation are various types of human beings' dependence on their own creations. 
(3)My thesis on the foundation of Marx' atheism in his anthropology fits well the way 
Marx describes the negative function of religion in society. Acceptance of dependence as 
the fundamental characteristic of humans' relation to God corresponds to acceptance of self­
despisal and subordination in relation to the world. According to Marx, these are the main 
features of the devious behavior that religion, as the opiate of the people, produces. 48 
(4)The above-mentioned thesis explains well the (relative) importance Marx ascribes to 
the ideological struggle against religion. As can easily be shown from his article, "Zur Kritik 
der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," this struggle is important for Marx as an indirect form 
of the struggle to overcome human alienation on the political and economic level. But 
religion itself represents also an important (though derivative) form of alienation which 
4 5Cf. Skledar and Kukoc, op.cit., 9 1 .  
4 6Cf. Karl Marx "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," Marx and Engels, op.cit., 378f. 
47Cf. Volf, op.cit. 
48Cf. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in op.cit., 378f. Marx, "Komunismus 
des 'Rheinischen Beobachters'" in Marx and Engels, Werke, Berlin, 1 977, IV, 200. 
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consists in the consciousness of human dependence on God. Besides the social there are thus 
also important anthropological reasons why the ideological struggle against religion is an 
integral (though not the primary) aspect of the struggle for the humanization of men and 
women. I suspect that Marx' "special disgust for Christianity," his desire to "deliver the last 
blow to Christianity" and his glorifying the Parisian revolutionaries as "assaulters of 
Heaven," 49 can best be explained by his view that the Christian faith is intrinsically and not 
only extrinsically alienating. 
(5)Taking the critique of dependence on God as the foothold of Marx' atheism fits well 
with the fact that Marx criticized religion not only when it hindered social liberation and 
social progress, but also when it desired to be an ally of Communists in the realization of 
their goals (although dependence on God is not the only reason why Marx rejected so called 
"religious communism"). 
(6)If we take the statement that human beings are the highest beings for themselves as 
the foundation of Marx' atheism then we can easily explain the centrality of the critique of 
earthly gods in Marx' thought. Earthly and heavenly gods are unacceptable for exactly the 
same reason. The demand that "there be no other" god besides human beings necessarily 
implies the denial of "all heavenly and earthly gods."50 Marx' refusal to reorient completely 
his critique from heavenly to earthly gods does not mean that his atheism is "contradictory", 
stretched "between heaven and earth."5 1 On the contrary, it would be inconsistent had he 
completed this reorientation, since--from the perspective of his understanding of religion as 
a form of human "production"-- he would have failed to criticize one essential aspect of 
human dependence on t heir own creatures. 5 2 
(7)Since the actual existence of God the Creator is incompatible with the postulate of 
human independence from God, it is understandable why Marx explicitly denied the 
existence of God from the beginning of his philosophical development to the end of his life. 
In his doctoral dissertation he says that besides human beings ("man") there can be no other 
god, 53 and toward the end of his life in an interview of 1871 he explicitly states, "I myself am 
49Cf. Veres, "The Ambivalence of Marx's Atheism," 554. 
50Marx, "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," in op.cit., 262. 
[Italics mine.] 
51Veres, "The Ambivalence of Marx's Atheism," 560. 
5 2A similar position is made (inconsistently) by Veres in ibid.,  554. 
53Marx, "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," in op.cit., 262. 
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an atheist." 5 4 Throughout his adult life Marx was a "naturalistic materialist" in whose thought 
there was "no place for the objective existence of a supernatural being and of otherworldly 
powers." 5 5  
(8)Marx' atheistic polemic against dependence on God's grace is comparable with an 
explicit statement in his early writings that atheism is only a transitory form of human 
consciousness. 5 6  The atheism which will not exist in socialism refers to the absence of the 
concept of God in the human mind. By its denial of God, atheism as a conscious attitude in 
one sense affirms God (namely as the object of denial) and is not appropriate in a state in 
which human beings will allegedly be the uncontested highest beings for themselves. As the 
critique of idols is unthinkable in the eschatological Kingdom of God, so also is atheism as 
a conscious denial of God unthinkable in Marx' kingdom of freedom. On the other hand, 
as the objective existence of idols is unthinkable in the Kingdom of God, so also is the 
objective existence of God unthinkable in Marx' kingdom of freedom. The atheism that is 
essential for Marx' vision of socialism refers to the absence of the objectively existing God. 
Such atheism is compatible with the absence of the subjective denial of God. 
VI 
The above reflection on the essentiality of atheism for Marx allows us to draw certain 
conclusions about the compatibility of Christianity and Marxism. Under what conditions is 
it possible for Christians to be Marxists? One can answer this question from two 
perspectives. The answer could contain the conditions under which a Christian would be 
acceptable to Marxists as a Marxist. Marxists themselves need to answer this question from 
this perspective. A Christian theologian does better to answer it by investigating the 
conditions under which a Christian would be acceptable to Christians as a Marxist, or a 
Marxist as a Christian. I will take this approach to the question in the final section of this 
study. 
If the investigation of the essentiality of atheism for Marx and Marxism is placed within 
the framework of the question about the conditions under which an individual can be both 
5 4Quoted by Jose P. Miranda, Marx Against the Marxists: The Challenge of Humanism of Karl 
Marx. London, 1 980, 280. 
5 5Skledar, Urn i religi ja , 33 and Kersevan, "Aktualnost Marxove kritike religije danas [The 
Relevance of Marx's Critique of Religion Today] Religije i drustvo [Religion and Society], Zagreb, 
1 987,  24. 
5 6Cf. Marx, "okonomisch-philosophische Manuscripte," op.cit., 546. 
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a Christian and a Marxist, then we are striving after a maximum in the relations between 
Christians and Marxists. Such an approach has its strengths and weaknesses, which I do not 
intend to examine here. In any case, it assumes that the dialogue between Marxists and 
Christians and their practical cooperation are both desirable and possible. 5 7 
If the previously mentioned arguments are cogent, from the Christian perspective a 
Christian can be a Marxist (or a Marxist can be a Christian) only if revisions of Marx' theory 
in three important areas are acceptable to Marxists. 
(I)Marxists would have to concede that two aspects of Marx' critique of religion are not 
essential for Marxism. First, one would have to consider Marx' theory of projection as 
accidental for Marxism. Religion is, no doubt, always historically mediated. Social factors 
influence the concrete forms of religious consciousness and it is important to investigate the 
character and extent of this influence. But religious consciousness cannot be reduced to an 
immediate or mediate reflection of the alienated world. 
Second, Marx' general statement about religion as the opiate of the people has to be given 
up. It is less appropriate to describe the authentic Christian faith as an "opium, lulling people 
with the promise of an afterlife" than as "a cup of coffee for the present." 58 This does not 
mean that Marx' critique of reactionary forms of the Christian faith is irrelevant. The 
biblical examples of the "divine critique of alienating worship" 59 shows that Marx's critique 
becomes indispensable the moment Christian faith abandons its task of serving concrete 
people. 
(2)0ne important aspect of Marx' anthropology needs to be revised. Marx' persuasion 
of the incompatibility of dependence on God's grace and human freedom must be taken as 
an accidental element of Marxist humanism. Marx himself prepared the way for such a 
broader understanding of humanism by considering certain forms of human dependence on 
nature and society compatible with human freedom. 60 But, of course, not all forms of human 
dependence on God are acceptable. There are alienating forms of human dependence on God 
which one must criticize in the name of God's holiness and human dignity. Furthermore, 
dependence on the one true God cannot justify dependence on various secular gods. On the 
5 70n the conditions for cooperation between Christians and Marxists cf. Srdjan Vrcan, "The 
Essentiality or Nonessentiality of Atheism in Marxism: Is it so Crucial?" JES, 22 ( I  985), 542ff. 
58So Jiirgen Moltmann in Miroslav Volf, "An Interview with Jiirgen Moltmann" in Communities 
of Faith and Radical Discipleship. Macon, 1 986, 1 0. 
59Cf. Miroslav Volf, "'I znam da sunce ne boji se tame': Teoloske meditacije o Santicevu vjerskom 
pjesnistvu," ['I Know that the Sun is not Afraid of the Darkness': Theological Meditations on the 
Poetry of Aleksa Santic] Zagreb/Osijek, 1 986, 57f. 
60Ibid. ,  section III. 
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contrary, with respect to secular divinities only an atheist; we must insist, can be a good 
Christian. 61 In the name of exclusive dependence on the one true God we must reject ali 
sacralization of secular realities. 
(3)As regards Marx' theory of emancipation, Marxists have to give up the requirement 
of methodological atheism in ali spheres of human life. Such atheism is incompatible with 
some central aspects of the Christian doctrine of salvation. The keys of human salvation are 
not in human hands. Hence the hope of human salvation cannot be only a hope in human 
efforts but above ali hope in the "liberating transcendence of God's grace." 6 2 Such a hope, 
however, demands active human involvement in carrying out socio-economic liberation. 
Further, in order to speak meaningfully from a Christian perspective about Christians 
who are Marxists (and vice versa), Marxists need to consider the absence of the consciousness 
of God as a marginal element of emancipated humanity. The consciousness of God as the 
subjective side of God's objective "dweiiing" among the people of God (cf. Revelation 21:3) 
is an inalienable characteristic of Christian eschatological hope. Indeed, the conscious 
relation to God, described often in the Christian tradition as "vision" and "enjoyment" of 
God, is the final goal of human existence. 63 
If the divergences from Marx' own views stated above were accepted as legitimately 
Marxist, then Christian faith and Marxism would not be separated by an unbridgeable gap. 
Whether or not Christians would become Marxists in this case would depend primarily on the 
persuasiveness of Marxism as an analysis and theory of social life. In any case, the Christian 
faith as such would not hinder Christians from becoming Marxists. 
61Cf. Ernst Bloch, Atheismus in Christentum: Zur Religion des Exodus und des Reiches. 
Frankfurt a. M. 1 968, 1 5 . 
6 2Jan Milic Lachman, "Christ and/or Prometheus: Theological Issues in the Encounter Between 
Christians and Marxists," JES, 22 ( 1985), 45 1 .  
63Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III. Providence, Notre Dame, London, 
1 975, LI-L VII; John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion. Philadelphia, 1 977, III, 25, I 0. 
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